In thinking about last week's midterm election, my mind is drawn to gaming out the next two years. Can the few liberals left in the U.S. Senate filibuster the President's agenda to the point where the administration's ambitious plans are tampered to some extent? Will Rep. Nancy Pelosi, D-Cal.'who is virtually assured of becoming the next Minority Leader'immediately go on the offensive or pick and choose her spots?
And who on earth will emerge as the Democrats' national spokesperson and, consequently, the leading candidate for the 2004 presidential nomination? Will it be one of the currently favored folks, like U.S. Sen. John Edwards, D-N.C.? Will it be a blast from the past, in the form of either former Vice President Gore, Sen. Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., or even Sen. Hillary Clinton, D-New York? Or will it be a rising star, like Gov. Howard Dean, D-Vermont? (My early tip to you, dear readers: watch Dean very, very closely.)
And yet, although the armchair strategizing is entertaining, my mind keeps thinking about the changing internal dynamics of the Democratic Party. While the GOP intramural fights between the Conservative and Libertarian wings did some amount of damage to the party in recent elections, the party came out of last week's election as a unified'and almost uniformly conservative'political force. By contrast, the war within the Democratic Party between neo-Liberal pragmatists and the party's core constituencies'a fight which has been on for the past decade or so'contributed greatly to the Democrats general disorganization and to last week's defeat.
The fight started in 1992, when the Clinton-Gore ticket swept into power through the utilization of a political strategy known as \triangulation."" Basically, this strategy is devoted to capturing what political scientists like to call ""the median voter""'the hypothetical person who stands smack-dab in the middle of the American electorate'while ensuring that the base was still compelled to remain within the fold.
In theory, this plan makes some sense, as the goal of any election is to ensure that you have more votes than your opponent. But the way in which the neo-Liberals went about putting this plan into action left some democratic activists fuming. By mimicking, or adopting outright, the Republicans' point of view on issues such as crime, welfare, trade and others while maintaining liberal positions on only as many issues as was absolutely necessary to hold the progressives, a good number of Democratic loyalists felt that the core principles of the party were being betrayed for the sole purpose of electoral success.
Nevertheless, the neo-Liberal plan worked well for a number of years. The plan gave President Clinton two terms. Moreover, after the GOP took control of Congress in 1995, the Democrats' tightly controlled centrist message allowed the party to significantly reduce the Republican majorities. However, the past two elections have shown that the strategy has the capacity to produce massive failures.
Consider the 2000 election first. The absence, perceived or actual, of clearly articulated differences between the Republicans and Democrats on most issues beyond abortion and gun control did send millions of possible democratic voters into Ralph Nader's camp. But, more importantly, the lack of differences made the Gore candidacy somewhat uncompelling. In the end'and as loathe as Democrats may be to admit this'the situation left the door open for George W. Bush, who presented to the public a moderately conservative worldview that was like Gore's in several key respects, but was not saddled with the lingering stench of scandal and deceit to which Gore was tightly chained. This led to Bush's clear victory in Gore's home state of Tennessee and'disregarding Florida and the Supreme Court'his election.
Much the same thing happened last week. To be sure, the Democrats have had some successes in the past two years'particularly on education legislation. But the Democrats put up little resistance to the Bush tax cut and basically gave away the store on almost every portion of the President's post-attack agenda'the war resolutions, the airline bailout, the PATRIOT act and so on. But the worst sin was the same error they committed in 2000'they failed to articulate the reasons why their policy proposals presented a viable, and preferable, alternative to the GOP agenda. And the reason for this failure is simple enough: beyond abortion and gun control, the publicly'stated policy standpoints of the people who are in control of the Democratic Party are almost indistinguishable from those of the Republican Party's leadership.
So, what are the Democrats to do? The necessary step right now is clear: they have to go on the offensive. This would require the formulation of a distinct policy alternative that provides demonstrable benefits to all sectors of society. And, consequently, the triangulation theory must be exchanged for strong liberal leadership, grounded in the principles that once made the Democratic Party great.
