Two recent studies concerning the discovery of mutated H5N1 virus strains, commonly known as avian flu, which are capable of transmission among mammals have generated a huge debate over the regulation and dissemination of scientific knowledge. Many scientist seem to b divided over whether the studies should be published since the virus strains could be used for bioterrorism. The papers in question, from the lab of Ron Fouchier at the Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands and by Yoshihiro Kawaoka at UW-Madison-submitted to "Science" and "Nature," respectively-await judgment from the scientific community, particularly from the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity.
The NSABB is a federal advisory committee of scientists and researchers. One of its goals is to advise on "policies governing publication, public communication, and dissemination of dual use research and methodologies." The NSABB was originally formulated so scientists could decide on the potential implications of specific research without having to involve lawmakers. It deals with publicizing studies that have the potential of "dual use," which is the capacity to be misused for ulterior motives apart from its legitimate purpose, such as weaponizing H5N1. It recommended that certain methodological details of both H5N1 studies should be restricted and made available to individuals on a need-to-know basis.
In a commentary submitted to Nature in January, Kawaoka argued that it would be irresponsible not to pursue research of the underlying mechanisms by which transmission between mammals occurs due to mutations in the virus. He also argues that the NSABB's recommendation of limiting accessibility to the research to select individuals might be a vain argument because enough information is already available for individuals to prepare a transmissible strain of the virus, and adhering to that recommendation will only hamper efforts to counter an H5N1 pandemic.
The reaction from NSABB scientists appears to have been hasty and overly cautious. In its effort to limit the publication of the research, the board seems to have lost sight of the bigger picture. Early insights into the mutation mechanism of the virus might prove to be extremely valuable in the case of an outbreak. In addition, availability of this research, like any other study, will allow for experts from diverse fields to contribute towards controlling the virus and developing effective drugs to combat it. Citing a far-fetched potential for bioterrorism to regulate scientific knowledge is short-sighted and doing so will retard our understanding of the virus. It is imperative that both studies be made public following peer review so research can be initiated to combat any threat posed by the virus.
