Discussing Wisconsin’s offensive productivity feels inherently wrong with the memory of its nightmarish 59-0 embarrassment at the hands of Ohio State still fresh. Yet, prior to that forgettable night in Indianapolis, the Badgers ranked 20th in total offense and were the 14th-best scoring team in the nation. They had put up at least 34 points in six of their prior seven games, and by all measures appeared to be a nearly unstoppable offensive force.
UW was able to move the ball at will and rack up points while operating primarily out of a Pro-I set, often with multiple tight ends and just one wide receiver on the field. When Melvin Gordon is your running back, you can get away with simply handing the ball off 25 times a game and not over-extending the playbook. Gordon’s 7.56 yards per play and 29 total touchdowns validated this straightforward, run-heavy game plan.
However, over the course of the season offensive coordinator Andy Ludwig integrated a few wrinkles that proved to have varying degrees of effectiveness. Using statistics compiled by The Daily Cardinal, it’s worth looking back at the play calls that generated a spark, and those that proved to be duds before the Badgers take on Auburn in the Outback Bowl Jan. 1.
The Badgers utilized the jet sweep, a package where a player split out wide crashes in motion toward the snap exchange, was utilized once or twice a game. It provided misdirection that challenged opponents’ lateral run defense. It was not called at all in the Northwestern game, likely due to the changes at quarterback, and it was used a season-high four times against Maryland. In total, Wisconsin executed the jet sweep 20 times, averaging 15.5 yards per play.
Kenzel Doe was the primary beneficiary of this play call. Coming in motion from his receiver slot, Doe ended up taking 11 carries for 103 yards, with his largest gain coming on a third-quarter, 31-yard rush against Nebraska. Opponents often loaded the box with eight defenders to stop Gordon, so Doe’s speed around the edge caught defenses out of position.
Gordon himself had four carries for 128 yards when coming in motion from the wide receiver position on a jet sweep call. Ludwig took advantage of Gordon’s versatility as not only a power back, but also as a rusher with lightning-quick speed to get to the edge. Gordon gained at least 40 yards on three of his four carries out of this set.
Interestingly, wide receiver Reggie Love scored the team’s only touchdown on a jet sweep rush, a 45-yard score against LSU in the first game of the season. However, Love did not get another carry for the rest of the season, and he had just two receptions on the year. At some point the redshirt sophomore must have lost the trust of Ludwig or suffered an unpublicized injury, as the explosiveness he displayed on his solitary carry would have nicely complemented Wisconsin’s offense.
Overall, the jet sweep was a valuable weapon for Wisconsin. Set up by the multitude of fake sweeps that typically preceded a rush up the middle, the Badgers used this pre-snap wrinkle sparingly to test the waters outside the tackle box. It’s difficult to say if it should have been called more regularly given its incredible efficiency. As a play that relies on misdirection, its overuse would nullify the effects it has on the defense, so Wisconsin was likely better served using it in the conservative fashion that it did.
Although the Badgers typically operate with the quarterback under center, they did occasionally call for the read option with Tanner McEvoy at the helm. In the five games McEvoy started, he picked up 101 yards and two touchdowns on 11 carries when he tucked the ball in read-option scenarios. However, after moving to the backup role, McEvoy was much more successful running the ball, with 21 read-option carries that went for 230 yards and three touchdowns.
While McEvoy’s rushing ability improved as the season went on, this might be an indication that he simply was not cut out to lead the offense full time. With the added pressure of being an every-down quarterback, McEvoy’s difficulty moving the ball through the air may have impacted his effectiveness as a runner. Once his role was simplified after he was replaced by Joel Stave in the Northwestern game, McEvoy excelled in running situations, as he only had to rely on his pure athleticism.
McEvoy shined against Iowa, as he had six carries for 62 yards and a touchdown. His 45-yard touchdown scamper in the second quarter was the first time the Badgers found the end zone against a stingy Hawkeye defense.
Gordon averaged over 5 yards per carry on his 19 read-option attempts and Corey Clement finished with 3 such carries, so it is clear that McEvoy got the most out of this set.
Wisconsin had the rare luxury of being able to put two top-tier running backs on the field at the same time. Gordon and Clement were usually together in the backfield on read-option calls, or Clement was split out wide as a receiver.
Later in the season, Gordon and Clement were often paired with McEvoy in the backfield to provide a threat that, although not used in the true sense of a triple-option, still drew enough of the defense’s attention to afford McEvoy room to run when he tucked the ball.
Using Gordon and Clement on the field together more often may have opened the opportunity to integrate some sort of triple-option set into the playbook, but given Gordon’s volume of carries, it was best to let him rest on the sidelines when Clement came into the game.
Although it did not utilize a great deal of complex sets or wildly innovative calls over the course of the season, Wisconsin showed that it can deviate from its core set of plays and still be an effective offensive threat. There’s no telling what direction the offense will go next season under head coach Paul Chryst, but for now the Badgers will look to find an effective mix between the reliability of putting the ball in the hands of Gordon and the big-play potential of its alternative playcalls.
